湖北农业科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 61 ›› Issue (13): 245-251.doi: 10.14088/j.cnki.issn0439-8114.2022.13.043

• 经济·管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

既有建筑绿色改造参与者的行为演化博弈分析

朱红章, 汪雷   

  1. 武汉大学土木建筑工程学院,武汉 430072
  • 收稿日期:2021-04-07 出版日期:2022-07-10 发布日期:2022-08-10
  • 作者简介:朱红章(1968-),男,湖北黄冈人,副教授,博士,主要从事国际工程项目管理方向研究,(电话)15927213714(电子信箱)361878489@qq.com
  • 基金资助:
    青年科学基金项目(71901165)

Evolutionary game analysis on behavior of participants in energy saving reconstruction of existing buildings

ZHU Hong-zhang, WANG Lei   

  1. School of Civil Engineering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • Received:2021-04-07 Online:2022-07-10 Published:2022-08-10

摘要: 既有建筑的绿色改造是全球绿色发展的要求,为了探究政府、消费者和企业在建筑节能改造推广过程中的作用,建立既有建筑绿色改造参与者的三方博弈模型,分析参与者的成本和增量收益等因素对建筑改造推广的影响,结合系统动力学原理,使用Vensim软件进行模拟,探讨了不同情形下的演化稳定策略。结果表明,提高既有建筑改造后带给博弈主体的增量收益,有助于促进既有建筑的绿色改造;政府的补贴激励政策在一定程度上可以促进既有建筑的绿色改造。

关键词: 既有建筑, 绿色改造, 演化博弈, 增量收益

Abstract: The energy-saving transformation of existing buildings is the requirement of global green development. In order to explore the role of government, consumers and enterprises in the process of building energy-saving transformation promotion, a tripartite game model of existing building energy-saving transformation participants was established, and the influence of the cost and incremental income of participants on building energy-saving transformation promotion was analyzed. Combined with the principle of system dynamics, Vensim software was used to simulate, and the evolutionary stability strategy in different situations was discussed. The results show that improving the incremental benefits brought to the game players after the transformation of existing buildings is helpful to promote the energy-saving transformation of existing buildings. The government’s subsidy incentive policy can promote the transformation of existing buildings to a certain extent.

Key words: existing buildings, energy-saving transformation, evolutionary game, incremental income

中图分类号: