Abstract: The direct reason caused by urban village land rental housing construction behavior is to ease the housing supply and demand, the implementation of the "purchase simultaneously" housing system, the economical and intensive utilization of land and the urgent need to interact and balance. The root cause is the conflict between urban land scarcity and local economic development needs. Through the evolutionary game analysis, it is found that the choice of the mode of urban renewal in local governments depends on the additional cost and the legitimacy risk of the modification. The rationality and satisfaction of the villagers depend on the legitimacy and investment return of the village reconstruction program. The result of bilateral strategic trade off often shows that the local government converges to the strategy of building rental housing, and the villagers tend to adopt a refusal strategy to protect their interests in order to prevent changes in local government strategies. Through the adjustment of the initial state of local governments and villagers, they can converge and evolve towards equilibrium and achieve a win-win situation. Therefore, based on the basic idea of improving the return on investment of residents and regulating the construction of rental housing in the villages, the improvement of the laws and procedures related to the construction of rental housing are proposed, the negotiation and participation mechanism in the whole process are structured, the supervision mechanism of internal and external interaction are established.

Key words: urban villager transformation, collective construction land, rental housing, evolutionary game