湖北农业科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 60 ›› Issue (6): 171-175.doi: 10.14088/j.cnki.issn0439-8114.2021.06.037

• 经济·管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

不完全契约条件下村干部激励机制研究

王萍   

  1. 河海大学公共管理学院,南京 211100
  • 收稿日期:2020-03-28 出版日期:2021-03-25 发布日期:2021-04-07
  • 作者简介:王 萍(1996-),女,安徽六安人,在读硕士研究生,研究方向为乡村治理,(电话)15951936510(电子信箱)2412818892@qq.com。

Research on the incentive mechanism of village cadres under incomplete contract

WANG Ping   

  1. School of Public Administration, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
  • Received:2020-03-28 Online:2021-03-25 Published:2021-04-07

摘要: 将经济学中的博弈理论引入到村干部激励机制的研究中,以委托代理理论作为理论工具和逻辑支撑,以不完全契约作为核心概念和研究条件,分析村干部的行为逻辑,以重塑村干部激励系统为主线,提出规避乡村治理中政策执行偏差的对策与建议。

关键词: 不完全契约, 博弈, 激励

Abstract: This research introduced the game theory of economics into the study of incentive mechanism of village cadres, using the principal-agent theory as the theoretical tools and logic support, using incomplete contract as the core concept and research condition, analyzing the behavior logic of village cadres, to reshape the incentive system of village cadres as the main line, put forward the countermeasures and suggestion to avoid the deviation of policy implementation in rural governance.

Key words: imperfect contract, game, stimulate

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