湖北农业科学 ›› 2025, Vol. 64 ›› Issue (12): 244-250.doi: 10.14088/j.cnki.issn0439-8114.2025.12.040

• 经济·管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于政府规制的新型农产品合作创新决策分析

程程   

  1. 西安工程大学,西安 710048
  • 收稿日期:2025-09-24 发布日期:2025-12-30
  • 作者简介:程 程(1984-),女,陕西西安人,讲师,硕士,主要从事公共经济学研究,(电话)13720405635(电子信箱)2501396873@qq.com。

Decision analysis of cooperative innovation of new agricultural products based on government regulation

CHENG Cheng   

  1. Xi’an Polytechnic University, Xi’an 710048, China
  • Received:2025-09-24 Online:2025-12-30

摘要: 考虑由于传统农产品在加工生产过程中,企业间会因传统农产品的时效造成农产品剩余,影响新鲜度。运用博弈理论研究了新型农产品制造商和供应商构成的农产品供应链对农产品新鲜度技术创新的最优决策,并分析了在政府规制情形下,非合作创新和合作创新下农产品供应链的整体利润、产量以及影响研究。通过分析得出,合作创新情形下的利润、产量、新鲜度效果最佳,以及政府通过鼓励和惩罚的方式规范企业行为,能够使企业积极投入技术创新,并提出相应的对策建议。

关键词: 农产品供应链, 合作创新, 新鲜度, 政府规制, 博弈论

Abstract: Considering that in the process of processing and production of traditional agricultural products, there would be surplus of agricultural products among enterprises due to the aging of traditional agricultural products, which would affect the freshness. Based on the game theory, the optimal decision of agricultural product supply chain composed of new agricultural product manufacturers and suppliers on agricultural product freshness technological innovation was studied, and under the government regulation, the overall profit, output and influence of agricultural product supply chain in non-cooperative innovation and cooperative innovation were analyzed. Through the analysis, it was concluded that the profit, output and freshness effect of cooperative innovation were the best, and the government regulated the enterprise behavior through encouragement and punishment, which could make enterprises actively invest in technological innovation, and some corresponding countermeasures and suggestions were put forward.

Key words: agricultural product supply chain, cooperative innovation, freshness, government regulation, game theory

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