Abstract: Behind land finance was a large number of land expropriation by local governments, which caused multi-interest conflicts. This study constructed the game model of relevant stakeholders, identified the interest relationship between government departments and land-lost farmers and the evolutionary stability strategy, and carried out numerical simulation and analysis of relevant influencing factors. The results showed that, ①when the net income of central government regulation was higher than the cost, the income of local government legal land expropriation was higher and land-lost farmers were compensated, the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system was supervision-legal land expropriation-acceptance of land expropriation; ② the rise of the central government's regulatory cost will weaken the tendency of regulatory strategy choice; ③ the increase of income from illegal land expropriation of local governments will weaken the tendency to choose legal land expropriation strategies;④the reduction of the cost of protecting the rights of land-lost farmers will drive the land-lost farmers to choose the strategy of resisting land acquisition. Therefore, it was of great significance to reform the land expropriation system, increase the punishment of illegal land expropriation, standardize the behavior of local government and construct a smooth channel for land-lost farmers to protect their rights to alleviate the land expropriation conflicts.

Key words: land finance, central government, local government, land-lost farmers, game, numerical simulation